Microsoft Defender for Identity
Identity protection

Alerts Mdi Classic

In brief

The Suspected identity theft (pass-the-hash) and Remote code execution attempt classic alerts will be retired at the end of November 2026. Monitoring alternatives are Microsoft Defender for Endpoint behavioral blocking and containment, and custom detections in Advanced hunting.

What Defender admins need to know

Administrators should account for these alerts leaving the service and review the documented monitoring alternatives before the retirement date.

Summaries are generated from the documentation change itself.

Documentation change

The comparison below shows only the changed extract. Use the full-page view for complete context.

Lateral Movement consists of techniques that adversaries use to enter and control remote systems on a network. Following through on their primary objective often requires exploring the network to find their target and subsequently gaining access to it. Reaching their objective often involves pivoting through multiple systems and accounts to gain. Adversaries might install their own remote access tools to accomplish Lateral Movement or use legitimate credentials with native network and operating system tools, which may be stealthier. Microsoft Defender for Identity can cover different passing attacks (pass the ticket, pass the hash, etc.) or other exploitations against the domain controller, like PrintNightmare or remote code execution.

Important

The Suspected identity theft (pass-the-hash) alert will be retired at the end of November 2026. You can continue monitoring this activity on onboarded devices with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. For more information, see Behavioral blocking and containment.

Security alert name Severity External ID
Suspected exploitation attempt on Windows Print Spooler service
Description:Adversaries might exploit the Windows Print Spooler service to perform privileged file operations in an improper manner. An attacker who has (or obtains) the ability to execute code on the target, and who successfully exploits the vulnerability, could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a target system. If run against a domain controller, the attack would allow a compromised non-administrator account to perform actions against a domain controller as SYSTEM.This functionally allows any attacker who enters the network to instantly elevate privileges to Domain Administrator, steal all domain credentials, and distribute further malware as a Domain Admin.Learning period: NoneMITRE: - Primary MITRE tactic : Lateral Movement (TA0008)- MITRE attack technique: Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) - MITRE attack sub-technique: N/ASuggested steps for prevention: - Due to the risk of the domain controller being compromised, install the security updates for CVE-2021-34527 on Windows domain controllers, before installing on member servers and workstations. - You can use the Defender for Identity built-in security assessment that tracks the availability of Print spooler services on domain controllers. Learn more.
High or Medium 2415

The following security alerts help you identify and remediate Other phase suspicious activities detected by Defender for Identity in your network.

Important

The Remote code execution attempt classic alert will be retired at the end of November 2026. You can continue monitoring this activity by creating custom detections in Advanced hunting. The query will be published in the Microsoft Defender XDR Community hub soon.

Security alert name Severity External ID
Suspected DCShadow attack (domain controller promotion)
Previous name: Suspicious domain controller promotion (potential DCShadow attack).Description:A domain controller shadow (DCShadow) attack is an attack designed to change directory objects using malicious replication. This attack can be performed from any machine by creating a rogue domain controller using a replication process.In a DCShadow attack, RPC, and LDAP are used to: - Register the machine account as a domain controller (using domain admin rights). - Perform replication (using the granted replication rights) over DRSUAPI and send changes to directory objects.In this Defender for Identity detection, a security alert is triggered when a machine in the network tries to register as a rogue domain controller.Learning period: None MITRE: - Primary MITRE tactic: Defense Evasion (TA0005)- MITRE attack technique: Rogue Domain Controller (T1207) - MITRE attack subtechnique: N/ASuggested steps for prevention:Validate the following permissions: - Replicate directory changes. - Replicate directory changes all. - For more information, see Grant Active Directory Domain Services permissions for profile synchronization in SharePoint Server 2013. You can use AD ACL Scanner or create a Windows PowerShell script to determine who has these permissions in the domain.Note: Suspicious domain controller promotion (potential DCShadow attack) alerts are supported by Defender for Identity sensors only.
High 2028