Mdo Integrate Security Service
In brief
The routing guidance now notes that messages quarantined by the Common Attachments Filter may be quarantined again after release because of the return mail-flow path. It also clarifies that submissions to Microsoft should use the initial message version.
What Defender admins need to know
Administrators using this routing topology should account for possible repeat quarantine and follow the updated submission guidance; no required action is stated.
Summaries are generated from the documentation change itself.
Documentation change
The comparison below shows only the changed extract. Use the full-page view for complete context.
Mail flow rules (transport rules) that look at original verdicts aren't ideal, because they can introduce other issues and lead to effectiveness challenges.
When your MX record points to Microsoft 365, messages quarantined as malware or high confidence phishing (HPHISH) are protected by secure by default behavior. Resolve the malware or HPHISH verdict before you release the message from quarantine, because these verdicts can't be bypassed when the message returns from a non-Microsoft service. For more information, see Secure by default in Office 365.
In this routing topology, messages quarantined by the Common Attachments Filter can be quarantined again after release because of the return mail flow path. If repeated release is a requirement, a potential workaround is to move attachment-type blocking to Exchange mail flow rules. However, this workaround reduces protection fidelity: mail flow rule-based attachment blocking doesn't provide the same true file-type protection as Common Attachments Filter detection in anti-malware policies and can increase false-negative risk.
Minimize false positives by overriding spoof for email arriving from the non-Microsoft service. For example, if the non-Microsoft service has an IP address of 172.17.17.35, create two allowed spoofed sender entries in the Tenant Allow/Block List: one External and one Internal as shown in the following screenshot:
Be sure to remove these override entries if you ever leave the non-Microsoft protection service or change how it functions.
False negative (bad mail allowed) and false positive email submissions to Microsoft should come from the initial version of the message, not the one that returns from the non-Microsoft service. False positives attributed to the non-Microsoft service should be sent to the non-Microsoft service. This requirement can be complex to manage:
- Microsoft false negative (missed at initial reception): You need a copy of the message before to delivery to the mailbox. Submit the copy in quarantine from the non-Microsoft service, if it's available.
- Microsoft + non-Microsoft service false negative: If both services miss it, we recommend reporting the original item to Microsoft and reporting the item in the recipient's mailbox to the non-Microsoft service. The item returned to Microsoft 365 from the non-Microsoft service includes details from the non-Microsoft service (for example, the non-Microsoft service's sending IP addresses, custom headers, etc.) which can lead to decreased machine learning effectiveness.
@@ -110,12 +110,13 @@ For these reasons, we strongly recommend avoiding this configuration, and workin
Mail flow rules (transport rules) that look at original verdicts aren't ideal, because they can introduce other issues and lead to effectiveness challenges.
2. When your MX record points to Microsoft 365, messages quarantined as malware or high confidence phishing (HPHISH) are protected by secure by default behavior. Resolve the malware or HPHISH verdict before you release the message from quarantine, because these verdicts can't be bypassed when the message returns from a non-Microsoft service. For more information, see [Secure by default in Office 365](secure-by-default).
-3. Minimize false positives by overriding spoof for email arriving from the non-Microsoft service. For example, if the non-Microsoft service has an IP address of 172.17.17.35, create two [allowed spoofed sender entries in the Tenant Allow/Block List](tenant-allow-block-list-email-spoof-configure#create-allow-entries-for-spoofed-senders): one External and one Internal as shown in the following screenshot:
+3. In this routing topology, messages quarantined by the [Common Attachments Filter](anti-malware-protection-about#common-attachments-filter-in-anti-malware-policies) can be quarantined again after release because of the return mail flow path. If repeated release is a requirement, a potential workaround is to move attachment-type blocking to [Exchange mail flow rules](/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/inspect-message-attachments). However, this workaround reduces protection fidelity: mail flow rule-based attachment blocking doesn't provide the same true file-type protection as Common Attachments Filter detection in anti-malware policies and can increase false-negative risk.
+4. Minimize false positives by overriding spoof for email arriving from the non-Microsoft service. For example, if the non-Microsoft service has an IP address of 172.17.17.35, create two [allowed spoofed sender entries in the Tenant Allow/Block List](tenant-allow-block-list-email-spoof-configure#create-allow-entries-for-spoofed-senders): one External and one Internal as shown in the following screenshot:
[](media/mdo-allow-entries-additional-security-service.png#lightbox)
Be sure to remove these override entries if you ever leave the non-Microsoft protection service or change how it functions.
-4. False negative (bad mail allowed) and false positive email submissions to Microsoft should come from the initial version of the message, not the one that returns from the non-Microsoft service. False positives attributed to the non-Microsoft service should be sent to the non-Microsoft service. This requirement can be complex to manage:
+5. False negative (bad mail allowed) and false positive email submissions to Microsoft should come from the initial version of the message, not the one that returns from the non-Microsoft service. False positives attributed to the non-Microsoft service should be sent to the non-Microsoft service. This requirement can be complex to manage:
- **Microsoft false negative (missed at initial reception)**: You need a copy of the message before to delivery to the mailbox. Submit the copy in quarantine from the non-Microsoft service, if it's available.
- **Microsoft + non-Microsoft service false negative**: If both services miss it, we recommend reporting the original item to Microsoft and reporting the item in the recipient's mailbox to the non-Microsoft service. The item returned to Microsoft 365 from the non-Microsoft service includes details from the non-Microsoft service (for example, the non-Microsoft service's sending IP addresses, custom headers, etc.) which can lead to decreased machine learning effectiveness.

